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In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court held that a district court decision
denying defendants' motion to dismiss "turned on an issue of law and
rejected the defense of qualified immunity," 2 and was therefore
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine that has been
applied to purely legal questions tied into denials of qualified
immunity.3 The Supreme Court in Iqbal rejected the plaintiffs
contention that "a qualified immunity appeal based solely on the
complaint's failure to state a claim" 4-rather than on the "ultimate"
qualified immunity issue of whether the acts allegedly committed by the
defendants constituted a violation of clearly established law-"is not a
proper subject of interlocutory jurisdiction. " "[A]ppellate jurisdiction is
not so strictly confined,"6 the Court concluded.
The Court distinguished its previous decision in Johnson v. Jones,7
which held that appellate courts hearing qualified immunity defenses on
interlocutory appeal should not address factual disputes.8 "Evaluating

*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Newton D. Baker/Baker & Hostetler Chair, Capital University Law School.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
Id. at 1946.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946.
Id.
Id.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
Id. at 319-320.
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the sufficiency of a complaint is not a 'fact-based' question of law," the
Iqbal Court concluded, and therefore "the problem the Court sought to
avoid in Johnson is not implicated here." 9
The Supreme Court took a similar approach two terms ago in Scott
0 a case involving a high-speed chase that resulted in serious
v. Harris,1
injury to the victim. The district court refused to award qualified
immunity to police because of many factual matters in dispute. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it did not have interlocutory
jurisdiction over facts. After viewing videos of the chase and
ramming-which were produced by deputies whose cameras
automatically filmed the events-Justice Scalia concluded for the Court
that the deputies' force was not excessive within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia seemed
to modify the holding in Johnson v. Jones, finding: "When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment."" "[Harris's] version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed
him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible
fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the

videotape."l 2
What do Scott and Iqbal do to Johnson v. Jones and its limit on
interlocutory appellate fact-finding? Obviously, Iqbal carves out a broad
exception for fact-pleading. How often will this be successfully used to
abort constitutional complaints? Assuming that it does not mark a
profound change in pleading practice, does Iqbal offer more room for
interlocutory fact-finding following denials of summary judgment? Or
does Iqbal represent an implicit rejection of Harris?
This Article explores the implications Iqbal holds for interlocutory
appeals. Unlike Harris, which implicitly blurred Johnson's distinction
between fact and law, Iqbal expressly authorized interlocutory appellate
courts to delve into the facts alleged in constitutional complaints. The
result is a further erosion of constitutional plaintiffs' ability to try their
cases. Even assuming that Iqbal got the pleading standard right-a large
assumption-governmental defendants will now have at least four
federal judges assess the factual worth of constitutional complaints. This
will inevitably make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed-not only

9. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947.
10. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
11. Id. at 380.
12. Id. at 380-81.
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because of the added delay (it will certainly encourage more appeals
from denials of dismissals) but also because it will increase the odds of
finding insufficient factual pleadings. Because of my basic disagreement
with the Supreme Court's qualified immunity doctrine,13 I find this to be
another troubling development in the war on abusive government.
I.

THE BASICS OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

The Supreme Court has made clear that qualified immunity presents
a legal question demanding prompt judicial attention, not only by a lone
district court judge, but also by a three-judge appellate panel and perhaps
even the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court in Hunter v.
Bryant, for example, observed that "[i]mmunity ordinarily should be
decided by the court long before trial," rather than be placed "in the
hands of the jury."' 4 Likewise, in Saucier v. Katz, the Court concluded
that not only was the defendant entitled to immunity, but "the suit should
have been dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings."' 5 Both
statements emphasize the Court's conclusion that qualified immunity
insulates the official not only from an award of money damages, but also
from the burdens of suit.
Because the defense of qualified immunity is, in part, a question of
law, it naturally creates a "super-summary judgment" right on behalf of
government officials. Even when an official is not entitled to summary
judgment on the merits-because the plaintiff has stated a proper claim
and genuine issues of fact exist-it can still be granted when the law is
not reasonably clear.
Even when the law is clear, qualified immunity affords
governmental defendants an added layer of factual protection; according
to Anderson v. Creighton,'6 the governmental defendant must have
reasonably known under all the facts and circumstances that her actions
were illegal.17 Thus, even though the law was generally clear, and even
though the governmental defendant violated it, immunity is still justified
if she could not have reasonably known as a factual matter that she
should not have acted as she did.
This double-edged advantage for governmental defendants is
magnified, moreover, by the collateral order doctrine, which permits

13. See Mark R. Brown, The Demise of ConstitutionalProspectivity: New Life for
Owen?, 79 IOWA L. REv. 273, 289 (1994) (arguing that the "case for immunity" is
"overstate[d]").
14. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
15. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001).
16. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
17. Id. at 640.
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immediate appeals from denials of qualified immunity in federal court.' 8
The Supreme Court concluded in Mitchell v. Forsyth'9 that the denial of
qualified immunity before trial is an appealable collateral order justifying
The defense can raise qualified
immediate interlocutory review.
immunity at a preliminary stage in the proceedings-for example, by
motions for summary judgment or dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6-and
press an immediate appeal should qualified immunity be denied.
Mitchell's interlocutory appeal mechanism has its bounds.
According to the Court in Johnson v. Jones,20 it guarantees government
officials interlocutory review of legal issues surrounding qualified
immunity but not necessarily of factual issues. Resolution of factual
questions is reserved-at least at the interlocutory stage-to the district
court. Johnson involved Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force
against five police officers. In response to three of the police officers'
claims that they were not present during the alleged beating, the district
court ruled that genuine issues of fact precluded awards of summary
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the police officers'
judgment.
interlocutory appeal, finding that it had no appellate jurisdiction over
factual matters in the absence of separate legal questions. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, agreed with the Seventh Circuit:
appellate courts cannot ordinarily review evidentiary sufficiency on
interlocutory appeal. Interlocutory jurisdiction, the Court found, is
confined to questions of law.
Whether the Court's holding in Johnson is prudential or
jurisdictional is unclear. The police officers argued that factual issues
often append themselves to legal ones, and thus should just as often fall
under an appellate court's pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's
response was guarded: "Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it
18. State courts are free to fashion their own rules on interlocutory appeals. See
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997) (holding that Idaho's failure to recognize
interlocutory appeals did not offend § 1983).
19. 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985). The Court in Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299
(1996), further ruled that qualified immunity can be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss before it is again raised in a motion for summary judgment. Given that the Court
has consistently referred to qualified immunity as a defense, the holding in Behrens
appears counter-intuitive. Its use under Rule 12(b)(6) places plaintiffs under pressure to
plead its absence, which would seem to transform its absence into an element of the
plaintiffs case rather than a true defense. Because it can be used under Rule 12(b)(6),
several lower courts adopted heightened pleading requirements for plaintiffs suing
officials under § 1983. But see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that heightened pleading is not required
in § 1983 suits against cities and counties); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)
(holding that heightened evidence standard is not permissible in § suit against officials);
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (holding that inmates need not satisfy heightened
pleading requirements notwithstanding adoption of Prison Litigation Reform Act).
20. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
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may sometimes be appropriate to exercise 'pendent appellate
jurisdiction' over such a matter, it seems unlikely that Courts of Appeals
would do so. . . ."21 It continued: "the court of appeals can simply take,
as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied
summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason."22 Should the lower
court fail to make findings or state its assumptions, the Supreme Court
reasoned, an appellate court need only review the record to determine
"what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, likely assumed." 23 Whether deemed a jurisdictional
bar or a prudential concern, Johnson v. Jones established that appellate
courts cannot engage in independent fact-finding on interlocutory appeal.
The Circuits following Johnson tended to eschew fact-finding on
interlocutory appeal because jurisdiction was lacking. In Hulen v. Yates,
for example, where a district court had denied summary judgment to a
defendant who allegedly violated the First Amendment by transferring a
public-sector employee, the Tenth Circuit stated that it could "not resolve
Defendants' claims that [the plaintiff] cannot show any personal
participation by these Defendants in the alleged retaliatory transfer
because of his motivation. This is an issue of evidentiary sufficiency,
over which we lack jurisdiction in a qualified immunity interlocutory
appeal." 24 Similarly, in Hamilton v. Leavy, a case involving deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, the Third Circuit
refused to review "the District Court's 'identification of the facts that are
subject to genuine dispute,' but instead . . . review[ed] the legal issues in

light of the facts that the District Court determined had sufficient
evidentiary support for summary judgment purposes."

21. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 319.
23. Id.
24. Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003).
25. Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2002). There were exceptions.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, occasionally ignored Johnson and engaged in
interlocutory fact-finding. Judge Toflat was notorious for this, and has never mended his
ways. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1294 n. 19 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J.)
("While the Supreme Court in Johnson ... held that appellate courts do not possess
jurisdiction over every interlocutory appeal based on a denial of qualified immunity, it
narrowly defined the proscribed class of cases as those where a defendant merely contests
the merits of the plaintiff s underlying action. In other words, we do not have jurisdiction
to entertain such appeals when the defendant's argument is merely, 'I didn't do it.' We
are not here presented with such a case.").

1322
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ENTER SCOTT V.HARRIS

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Harris v. Coweta County,2 6
further illustrated appellate courts' application of Johnson v. Jones. In
Harris,county deputies had chased a motorist (Harris) who was clocked
driving 73 mph in a 55-mph-zone. Because Harris refused to stop, a
deputy (Scott) eventually decided to ram him and force him off the road.
The resulting crash caused serious injuries to Harris and left him a
quadriplegic.27
Harris sued Scott (and the county) under § 1983 for excessive force.
Because Scott purposely rammed Harris, his action was clearly a Fourth
Amendment event. The claim raised by Harris was whether the deputy's
actions were excessive under the Fourth Amendment. Scott moved for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court
refused to award summary judgment because of genuine issues of
material fact and Scott took his interlocutory appeal. The Eleventh
Circuit, "view[ing] the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in his favor,"
concluded that summary judgment was not warranted.
The Supreme Court reversed in Scott v. Harris.2 8 In reaching the
merits, Justice Scalia implicitly modified the holding in Johnson v.
Jones: sometimes appellate courts can engage in interlocutory factfinding.29 Where the plaintiffs version of events is "utterly discredited
by the record," the appellate court can disregard it. 3 0
Only Justice Stevens dissented: "If two groups of judges can
disagree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the
circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a
reasonable juror could disagree with this Court's characterization of
events." 3 ' Regarding Justice Scalia's interpretation of the video, Justice
Stevens observed that "three judges on the Court of Appeals panel
apparently did view the videotapes entered into evidence and described a
very different version of events."32
What did Scott do to Johnson v. Jones? Harris argued before the
Supreme Court that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over factual issues26. Harris v. Coweta County, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd on rehearing,
433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
27. If the reader has fifteen minutes or so, she may want to view the digital video
attached to the Supreme Court's opinion in Scott, 550 U.S. at 372
(http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06slipopinion.html) (As a matter of trivia, this
marks the first time the Supreme Court attached a video to an opinion.).
28. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 372.
29. Id. at 380.
30. Id. at 380-81.
31. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 395.
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like the reasonableness of the force used against him. Neither the
majority nor the dissent mentioned the matter or cited Johnson v. Jones.
Hence, the Supreme Court obviously felt it had jurisdiction regardless of
the interlocutory nature of the appeal.
Even though it obviously created tension with Johnson v. Jones,
Scott was generally given a limited reach by the Courts of Appeals. It
was not generally treated as a blank check to engage in de novo factfinding. Rather, district courts' findings of genuine issues of material
fact continued to draw deference and respect on interlocutory appeal.34
Still, some courts took a different path, holding that Scott authorized
fact-finding to determine whether a civil rights plaintiffs alleged facts
were "blatantly contradicted by the record." In Bass v. Goodwill, for
example, where a prisoner challenged prison conditions, the court
observed that "even in an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, we
need not accept the district court's factual determinations to the extent
that they are 'blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe [them].'" 3 5 The Tenth Circuit flatly stated that
Johnson v. Jones was a "dead letter in light of Scott v. Harris."6 Thus,
appellate courts were free to inquire on interlocutory appeal whether a
plaintiffs version of events was "blatantly contradicted" by the record.
Even the Sixth Circuit, which had staunchly refused before Scott to

33. I address this matter more fully in Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of
QualifiedImmunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEv. L.J. 185, 219-220 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Culosi v. Bullock, 2010 WL 610625 (4th Cir., Feb. 22, 2010) (finding
in deadly force setting that it had no interlocutory jurisdiction under Johnson); Scott v.
Venegas, 320 Fed. Appx. 265 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that disputed issues deprive court
of interlocutory jurisdiction); Williams v. Sirmons, 307 Fed. Appx. 354 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding that probable cause presented factual issue that precluded interlocutory
jurisdiction); Anderson Group, LLC v. Lenz, 336 Fed. Appx. 21 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that appellate court had no interlocutory jurisdiction over facts); Tennison v. City and
County of San Francisco, 548 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no jurisdiction to
engage in interlocutory fact-finding); Pillow v. City of Lawrenceburg, 319 Fed. Appx.
347, 349 (6th Cir. 2008) ("To the extent an argument in this setting merely quibbles with
the district court's factual assessment of the record, we do not have jurisdiction to review
it.") (emphasis in original).
35. Bass v. Goodwill, 2009 WL 4642367, *4 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 2009) (citing Scott
and Blossom v. Yarbrough, 429 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir.2005)). See also Boyd v. City of
Hermosa Beach, 321 Fed. Appx. 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2009) ("this is not a case in which
one side's version of events is "blatantly contradicted by the record.").
36. Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1119 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
37. Rhoads v. Miller, 2009 WL 3646078 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2009) (court inquires of
whether inmate's claim was blatantly contradicted by the record); Green v. Post, 574 F.3d
1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (in high speed pursuit case appellate court watches video to
determine if light was red and concludes contrary to plaintiffs claim that it was yellow);
Weatherford ex rel. Thompson v. Taylor, 347 Fed. Appx. 400 (10th Cir. 2009) (appellate
court may inquire of blatant contradiction).
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engage in interlocutory fact-finding,3 8 opined that "logic dictates that
Scott must have modified Johnson's language about jurisdiction to reach
the result it did."39 Thus, in Moldowan v. City of Warren, it stated that
"[i]n trying to reconcile Scott with the Supreme Court's edict in Johnson
this Court has concluded that 'where the trial court's determination that a
fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a
court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory appeal."'40
Some courts in the aftermath of Scott appeared to limit interlocutory
fact-finding to appeals that have the benefit of videos. For instance, in
41
which involved a successful interlocutory appeal
Mecham v. Frazier,
following the district court's denial of qualified immunity to two police
officers who had allegedly used excessive force, the Tenth Circuit cited
Scott in noting that "[t]he facts are in little doubt since [the] squad car
was equipped with a dashboard camera which recorded the incident."42
Similarly, in Marvin v. City of Taylor,43 which came to the court on
interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit used police video footage that
accompanied an arrest to independently judge the reasonableness of the
officers' force.4
In contrast, where there was no video, several courts ruled that Scott
did not apply. The Third Circuit so held in Blaylock v. City of
45
which involved an allegedly false arrest and excessive
Philadelphia,
use of force by several police officers. Following the district court's
denial of summary judgment, the Third Circuit on interlocutory appeal
observed that "Scott would thus appear to support the proposition that, in
this interlocutory appeal, we may exercise some degree of review over
However, the Third Circuit
the District Court's determination... ."
also observed that "the Court [in Scott] had before it a videotape of
undisputed authenticity depicting all of the defendant's conduct and all
of the necessary context that would allow the Court to assess the
reasonableness of that conduct." 4 7 "Such a scenario may represent the
outer limit of the principle of Johnson v. Jones-where the trial court's
38. See, e.g., Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, 2009 WL 3351751 (6th Cir. Oct. 20,
2009) (finding no jurisdiction to engage in interlocutory fact-finding).
39. Wysong v. City of Heath, 260 Fed. Appx. 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2008).
40. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2009).
41. Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).
42. Id. at 1202 n.2.
43. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007).
44. Id. at 240 (stating that "we exercise de novo review, and considering that all
parties appear to agree that the video files before this Court should have been before the
District Court, this Court will assess the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity based
upon the videos").
45. Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2007).
46. Id. at 414.
47. Id
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determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and
demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory
review."48 Because it did not "have a situation in which 'opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,",A9 the court found
that it lacked appellate jurisdiction.o
One might argue that Scott is limited to the Fourth Amendment,
where mixed questions of law and fact are the norm. Because these
issues are ultimately reviewed independently by courts of appeals, 5 ' after
all, they should be reviewed de novo on interlocutory appeal, too. 52
Ornelas v. United States5 3 arguably supports this proposition. There, the
Supreme Court ruled that the ultimate question of whether probable
cause supports a search is to be addressed independently on appeal: "We
think independent appellate review of these ultimate determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause is consistent with the position
we have taken in past cases. We have never, when reviewing a probablecause or reasonable-suspicion determination ourselves, expressly
deferred to the trial court's determination." 5 4
Though this interpretation of Scott has some appeal-given the
case's Fourth Amendment contours-it seems to prove too much. The
Supreme Court, after all, has not ruled that excessive force is to be
treated the same way probable cause is addressed on appeal. Lower

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Green v. New Jersey State Police, 246 Fed. Appx. 158, 159 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2007) (noting that unlike in Scott the videos were "inconclusive on several of the key
disputed facts"); Rhoads v. Miller, 2009 WL 3646078 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2009) (holding
in excessive force case that appellate court lacked jurisdiction because no video blatantly
contradicted plaintiffs proof); Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009)
(in high speed pursuit case appellate court watches video to determine if light was redconcludes it was yellow).
51. This was the government's response in Scott v. Harris. When asked whether the
Supreme Court was bound by lower courts' version of the facts, the government
responded at oral argument that "the answer to that question was provided in ... Ornelas
versus United States, a decision by this Court in 1996 that came up in the context of... a
direct criminal appeal involving the question of probable cause. And this Court set forth
very clearly that ... [the] legal question about whether those facts reasonably give rise to
probable cause is an independent [question subject to] de novo review." Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007) (Rebuttal by Petitioner at 54-55).
52. This seemed to be the Fifth Circuit's implicit approach in Pasco ex rel. Pasco v.
Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009), which involved a high speed chase much like
that in Harris. The court engaged in fact-finding on interlocutory appeal and awarded the
police qualified immunity. Judge Garwood dissented to say that facts were in dispute,
there was no video, and the matter should have been left to the District Court in the first
instance.
53. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
54. Id. at 697.
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courts have not commonly ignored Johnson v. Jones simply because an
ultimate question of excessive force was raised under the Fourth
Amendment.s Whether force is reasonable within the constitutional
meaning of the term would thus, given the precedent at the time Scott
was decided, seem to pretty clearly present a factual issue subject to the
usual standards of review on appeal, including that announced in
Johnson v. Jones.56
Perhaps more troubling, this interpretation of Scott would not only
empower appellate courts to sift through denials of summary judgments
55. In Cowan v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756 (2d Cir. 2003), for example, the estate of a
motorist who was fatally shot by police brought suit for excessive force. The police
officer unsuccessfully moved for qualified immunity in the district court and then took an
interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. Finding that qualified immunity-"whether it
was reasonable for [the police officer] to believe that his life or person was in danger"constituted the "very question upon which [it and the district court] found there are
genuine issues of material fact" Id. at 764. The Second Circuit affirmed. Although it
had jurisdiction to address the interlocutory appeal, it had no authority to revisit the
District Court's assessment of the facts.
The Third Circuit reached this same conclusion in Rivas v. City of Passaic,365 F.3d
181 (3d Cir. 2004), another excessive force case. Following the district court's denial of
summary judgment based on qualified immunity, police charged with excessive force
took an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit. The court stated that "if a defendant in
a constitutional tort case moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and
the district court denies the motion, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district
court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to
prove. . . ." Id. at 192 (quoting Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir.
2002)). Because a "reasonable jury could find from these facts that [the victim] did not
present a threat to anyone's safety," id. at 200, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower
court's denial of summary judgment. See also Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that interlocutory appeal does not even lie in excessive force
case).
56. In Kent v. Katz, 312 F.3d 568 (2d Cir. 2002), for example, the Second Circuit
affirmed a district court's refusal to award summary judgment and refused to resolve
factual issues that surrounded the reasonableness of an arrest. Likewise, in Gray-Hopkins
v. Prince George's County, 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002), an excessive force case
arising under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit stated that "to the extent that the
appealing official seeks to argue the insufficiency of the evidence to raise a genuine issue
of material fact-for example, that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a
conclusion that the official engaged in the particular conduct alleged-we do not possess
jurisdiction under § 1291 to consider the claim." See also Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229,
1240 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that appellate court could "not resolve Defendants' claims
that [the plaintiff] cannot show any personal participation by these Defendants in the
alleged retaliatory transfer because of his motivation. This is an issue of evidentiary
sufficiency, over which we lack jurisdiction in a qualified immunity interlocutory
appeal."); Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that appellate
court could not review "the District Court's 'identification of the facts that are subject to
genuine dispute,' but instead . .. review[ed] the legal issues in light of the facts that the
District Court determined had sufficient evidentiary support for summary judgment
purposes."); Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) ("we have no
appellate jurisdiction to the extent disputed facts are central to the case"); Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).
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on interlocutory appeal, it would also invite appellate courts to
independently review evidentiary sufficiency following final judgment.
As things stand, a district court's final conclusion-whether by bench or
a properly instructed jury-that a police officer used unreasonable force
is ordinarily subject to deferential review on appeal. The traditional
approach has been to inquire whether enough evidence was presented to
support the verdict; not whether the verdict is correct.58
Before Iqbal, Scott's reach therefore appeared limited. The presence
of a conclusive video in the context of an ultimate issue (such as the
reasonableness of a police officer's force under the Fourth Amendment)
that blatantly contradicted the plaintiffs factual allegations could justify

57. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding in
criminal civil rights case against police officer for using excessive force that jury's
finding of unreasonable force was supported by sufficient evidence).
58. This does not mean that district courts have blank checks to deny summary
judgments to government officials just because there are genuine issues of material fact
as to constitutional issues. Qualified immunity doctrine still requires that where the
controlling law was unsettled summary judgment is in order. And even when the
underlying law is clear, an official might still reasonably (though mistakenly) believe that
his actions are lawful. This can hold true, moreover, even though the ultimate factual
conclusion (reasonableness of force, for example) is genuinely at issue. The Supreme
Court explained this latter possibility in the context of excessive force in Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001). There, in the course of removing a demonstrator from a military
base, the officer allegedly delivered the demonstrator a "gratuitously violent shove."
Observing that the ultimate reasonableness of this shove was genuinely at issue, the
district court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the questions of ultimate
reasonableness for Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity purposes were one and
the same (and both for the jury). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there was
room between the questions. Even if the officer had shoved the demonstrator in a
constitutionally unreasonable fashion, he could have still reasonably believed it to be
necessary for purposes of qualified immunity. Notwithstanding that a jury would have
had sufficient evidence to return a verdict for the plaintiff, the district court still could
have awarded the officer qualified immunity. Because the Court in Saucier went on to
determine that the agents' conduct was not unreasonable for purposes of qualified
immunity, one might argue that it offers support for the power of appellate courts to
entertain ultimate factual questions on interlocutory appeal-at least where the factual
matter is one of ultimate reasonableness for purposes of qualified immunity. Such a
reading, however, is not compelled, and would seem to be a bit of a stretch. The Court,
after all, granted certiorari on the purely legal question of whether "reasonableness" is
necessarily coterminous under the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity. Neither
party raised Johnson v. Jones as a potential problem, and the Court never mentioned it
either during argument or in its opinion. The facts, according to the Court, were largely
"uncontested." Rather than engage in any fact-finding, the Court simply accepted the
plaintiffs facts and ruled that on these uncontested facts the defendants could have
believed they were entitled to use minimal force. A better reading of Saucier, therefore,
is simply that the officers' uncontested use of de minimus force was reasonable within
the meaning of qualified immunity. Read in this fashion, Saucier says little about
interlocutory jurisdiction over "ultimate" factual disputes.
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de novo review by an interlocutory appellate court. Johnson v. Jones's
prohibition on interlocutory fact-finding was otherwise preserved.
III. APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF IQBAL V. ASHCROFT
Iqbal does not claim that Johnson was overruled by Harris. Indeed,
Iqbal does not even mention Harris. Justice Kennedy's unanimous
conclusion that the Court had interlocutory jurisdiction went to great
lengths to explain why pleading is different. Justice Kennedy explained
his reasoning this way: "The concerns that animated the decision in
Johnson are absent when an appellate court considers the disposition of a
motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings." 9 Although he
acknowledged that "the categories of 'fact-based' and 'abstract' legal
questions used to guide the Court's decision in Johnson are not well
defined,"6 0 the decision to deny the defendants' motion to dismiss "falls
well within the latter class."61 He reasoned that the case required an
appellate court to "consider[] only the allegations contained within the
four corners of [the plaintiffs] complaint," 62 and that the decision
whether a complaint "has the 'heft' to state a claim is a task well within
an appellate court's core competency."6 3 "Evaluating the sufficiency of a
complaint is not a 'fact-based' question of law," 64 Justice Kennedy
concluded, and therefore "the problem the Court sought to avoid in
Johnson is not implicated here."65
Relying on this distinction, the Eighth Circuit in Heartland
Academy Community Church v. Waddle opined that Iqbal
"foreclosed ... [an] attempted end-run around Johnson."66 Iqbal, the
court observed, proved that in terms of fact-finding-as opposed to factpleading-Johnson's prohibition on interlocutory jurisdiction remained
the rule.
Is the Eighth Circuit's conclusion-essentially making lemonade
out of Iqbal's lemons-sound? Probably not. I doubt that Justice
Kennedy meant to cabin Harris'sextension of interlocutory fact-finding
by holding that interlocutory review of fact-pleading is proper. Instead, I
view Iqbal as implicitly extending the "idea" of Harris-theidea being

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947.

65.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

66. Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 808 (8th Cir.
2010).
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that procedural rules are disposable in the face of justifiable ends-from
denials of summary judgment to denials of motions to dismiss.
The former, after all, have historically proven more successful for
government officials. Before Iqbal, appellate courts were loathe to hear
fact-bound Rule 12(b)(6) claims on interlocutory appeal. This was true
even after Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 67 which ostensibly required all
plaintiffs-including those proceeding under § 1983 6 8 -to plead
plausible facts. The Seventh Circuit, for example, in Khorrami v.
Rolince rejected the governmental defendant's claim on interlocutory
appeal that Twombly authorized it to "look at the complaint for ourselves
and decide whether [the plaintiff] can make such a showing." 6 9 Instead,
before Iqbal, appellate courts sitting in an interlocutory capacity tended
to simply accept plaintiffs' alleged facts as true-the same standard
imposed under Johnson v. Jones.
Iqbal makes it clear that interlocutory appellate courts must apply a
more demanding standard to fact-pleading. Pleaded facts cannot be
taken at face value-which was the standard that was commonly applied
under Johnson v. Jones. Rather, constitutional plaintiffs must plead
"'sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face."' 70 Thus, the frequency of fact-based appeals
from denials of Rule 12(b)(6) motions is sure to increase after Iqbal.
What was once a little-used procedural device-taking an interlocutory
appeal from a denial of a 12(b)(6) motion based on insufficient factual
pleadings-will likely become much more common.
Along with the increased frequency of "plausibility" appeals will
come an increase in the frequency of qualified immunity. Rather than
just having one judge scrutinize a plaintiffs complaint, governmental
defendants are now entitled to having three more (at least) review the
67. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
68. But see Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam) (finding that
inmate's § 1983 complaint satisfied Twombly and thereby suggesting that the latter did
not really apply to § 1983 cases).
69. 539 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2008). See also Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949
(9th Cir. 2009) ("As we have recognized in the past, interlocutory review of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss puts our court in the difficult position of deciding 'farreaching constitutional questions on a nonexistent factual record."'); Weise v. Casper,
507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007) ("If a district court cannot rule on the merits of a
qualified immunity defense at the dismissal stage because the allegations in the pleadings
are insufficient as to some factual matter, the district court's determination is not
immediately appealable.").
70. Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 956 ("because Ashcroft chose to exercise his right to appeal
before a fuller record could be developed, we proceed as we must in a review of all Rule
12(b)(6) motions, accepting as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must aver in his complaint 'sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."').
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complaint. If two of these three find the pleading inadequate, dismissal
under the guise of qualified immunity will result. Even assuming that
Iqbal has the standard right-an assumption that I do not share-the
odds of qualified immunity must increase.
Proponents of qualified immunity will argue that Iqbal simply
increases the chances of "getting it right." After all, whether in the
district court or on appeal, the point is to properly apply whatever
pleading standard exists. So long as the appeal helps avoid a needless
trial, it is worth the price. Iqbal, then, is akin to a referee or umpire
relying on instant video replay to determine whether a foot falls out-ofbounds or home run went foul. Accuracy justifies any cost.
The reality, however, is that accuracy is rarely worth all the costs.
If it were, referees and umpires would always be staring at instant
replays. Coaches would be given unlimited "challenge" flags. Games
would never end. Whether in sports or law, society recognizes that
accuracy must be balanced against temporal costs, the price of additional
personnel, and the benefit of orderly processes.
In the context of litigation, this translates into the final judgment
rule, which ordinarily prohibits losing parties from taking piecemeal
appeals. Courts across the country generally recognize that interlocutory
appeals-getting it right as soon as possible-are not worth the cost.
"Getting it right," then, cannot be accepted as a gainsay justification
for dispensing with any and all procedures. Like it or not, interlocutory
appeal is frowned upon because it is disruptive, time-consuming and
costly. Interlocutory fact-finding, as recognized in Johnson v. Jones, is
even more so. And contrary to Justice Kennedy's conclusion, so is
interlocutory review of fact-pleading. On balance, I do not believe that
this kind of interlocutory review will be worth the candle.
On the assumption that Iqbal's pleading standard is intended to be
minimal and forgiving, interlocutory review should seldom result in a
reversal of a district court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. I suspect,
then, that Iqbal will encourage a large number of meritless fact-pleading
appeals, while rarely resulting in reversals of district court decisions.
Accuracy will be only marginally enhanced; the appellate docket's
increase will be significant.
It could be, however, that Justice Kennedy intends his Iqbal
standard to have more bite. This certainly seems to be the fear of
plaintiffs' lawyers on the private side of the divide; and it may prove
true. Assuming that Iqbal's pleading standard is meant to drastically
increase pleading standards in constitutional litigation, interlocutory
appeals would seem to make more sense. Appellate courts will more
often need to correct district court decisions, and there will be more to
the accuracy side of the ledger. It is too soon to determine whether this
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is where Iqbal is headed, but my sense from listening to comments from
the bench and bar at this Symposium is that lower courts are not likely to
aggressively pursue this path.
Regardless of whether Iqbal emerges with more teeth than
Twombly, I suspect that it will not cause a sea-change in the way
constitutional cases are pleaded. For "public-sector" plaintiffs' lawyers
(those who sue government under § 1983 and Bivens), Iqbal's pleading
standard does not significantly increase the hazard of not pleading a
proper constitutional complaint. Granted, the Court ruled that the
constitutional plaintiffs in Iqbal did not live up to this new standard, but I
do not see that as general or systemic result. The reason is simple: §
1983 and Bivens have been subjected to de facto heightened pleading
requirements for quite some time. These cases are generally pleaded
with more specificity than garden-variety complaints. Iqbal, therefore,
does not demand much more than what was already required.
Of course, some will point to the Supreme Court's three opinions,
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit,n Crawford-El v. Britton,72 and Jones v. Bock, which ostensibly
collectively refuse to authorize increased pleading requirements in
constitutional cases.74 The Court, however, has never squarely ruled that
constitutional plaintiffs suing governmental officials for damages cannot
be subjected to heightened pleading standards. Leatherman involved a
suit against local government, Britton addressed evidentiary standards,
and Bock involved the Prison Litigation Reform Act. None addressed
the standard for pleading around qualified immunity. Given this gap, the
Eleventh Circuit continues to impose a heightened pleading requirement
on constitutional plaintiffs who are faced with qualified immunity
defenses. 75 The Fifth Circuit also continues to impose a heightened
standard-at least some of the time.76 Several circuits implicitly
71. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that heightened pleading is not required in § 1983 suits against
cities and counties).
72. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (holding that heightened evidence
standard is not permissible in § suit against officials).
73. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (holding that inmates need not satisfy
heightened pleading requirements notwithstanding adoption of Prison Litigation Reform
Act).
74. See also Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam) (finding that
inmate's § 1983 complaint satisfied Twombly and thereby suggesting that the latter's
heightened pleading standard did not really apply to § 1983 cases).
75. See, e.g., Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2010).
76. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of Kenner, 351 Fed. Appx. 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) ("In
reviewing those claims, we are guided both by the ordinary pleading standard and by a
heightened one."). The Floyd court pointed to qualified immunity to justify its
heightened standard. Because qualified immunity can be raised in a motion to dismiss,
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demanded more of § 1983 plaintiffs long before Twombly and Iqbal
came along. And even in those circuits where the rule was clear-no
heightened pleadingn-one suspects that most lawyers erred on the side
of caution. In sum, constitutional plaintiffs' lawyers have become used
to heightened pleading requirements; Iqbal does not present much of a
change for them.
As for Harris, I suspect that Iqbal will encourage more
interlocutory fact-finding on appeal; not less. Together, Harrisand Iqbal
represent a basic distrust of the district courts' collective abilities to
protect governmental defendants. Both cases point to more-not lessinterlocutory review. Johnson v. Jones may not, as the Tenth Circuit
claimed,7 8 be a "dead letter." But its preference for efficiency and
respect for district court fact-finding appears to be on life-support.
IV. CONCLUSION

Iqbal is meaningful in several ways. First and foremost, it reflects a
contrived effort to protect high-ranking officials from charges connected
with the government's war on terror. Second, its sua sponte rejection of
supervisory liability rewrites a significant aspect of the law of
constitutional litigation. Third, its new pleading standard materially
alters commonly understood requirements in private-sector litigation.
Fourth, its nod toward interlocutory review of fact-finding-through
pleading as well as proof-will make it more difficult for constitutional
victims to have their day in court. Last, but not least, Iqbal's
heaps
needlessly
fact-pleading-review-mechanism
interlocutory
additional burdens on what is already an over-burdened appellate court
system. For all these reasons, Iqbal is a disaster.

plaintiffs are naturally encouraged to anticipate it in their complaints-thus creating a
heightened pleading effect.
77. See, e.g., Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
2002).
78. Price-Comelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1119 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).

